Naval War College Review
Volume 63
Number 4 Autumn

Article 7

2010

The Canadian Navy and Canada’s National
Interests in This Maritime Century
Dean McFadden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
McFadden, Dean (2010) "The Canadian Navy and Canada’s National Interests in This Maritime Century," Naval War College Review:
Vol. 63 : No. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

McFadden: The Canadian Navy and Canada’s National Interests in This Maritim

THE CANADIAN NAVY AND CANADA’S NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN THIS MARITIME CENTURY
Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, Canadian Navy

I

n my centennial message at the beginning of [the Spring 2010] issue of the Canadian Naval Review, I reflected briefly on our history as a navy. In this article,
I will offer my reflections on the future. While no one can predict exactly what
will happen in the decades ahead, I am confident in stating two things about the
Vice Admiral McFadden assumed responsibilities in
21st century. First, the oceans will be of increasing imJune 2009 as Chief of the Maritime Staff and Comportance to Canada’s security and prosperity. Second,
mander, Maritime Command, having completed sevirtually every defence and security challenge I can
quential tours in joint formations, most recently as
Commander Canada Command and, prior to that, as
envisage will require that Canada integrate all of the
Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic/Joint Task
elements of the Canadian Forces—in fact, the entire
Force (Atlantic). Prior to this work his experience was
arsenal of skills and competencies that this county has
primarily in the conduct of fleet and task group operations, at every level of command: in HMCS Montréal;
at its disposal—if it is to succeed.
Sea Training (Atlantic); Fifth Maritime Operations
The aim of this article is not to focus on how the
Group; and finally, as commander of Canadian Fleet
Canadian Forces must organize to meet challenges,
Atlantic and of the high-readiness task group. In this last
assignment he led a joint/interagency task group, combut rather what these challenges are likely to be, and
posed of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard elewhy they should matter to Canadians. I will argue, as
ments, in support of the disaster-relief mission to U.S.
Gulf states in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
you might expect, that Canada’s maritime air and naVice Admiral McFadden is a graduate of Royal Roads
val forces will make a substantial contribution to adMilitary College, with a degree in physics and physical
dressing these challenges, as they did in the past 100
oceanography, and of the Command and Staff Course
years and as they do today, as was so recently evident
and the Advanced Military Studies Programme at the
Canadian Forces College. He is a fellow of the Asiain Haiti, Vancouver and off the Horn of Africa. But
Pacific Centre for Security Studies.
first, let me explain why the 21st century will be a maritime century.
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Today’s global maritime order is based on a delicate geopolitical and juridical
balance between two central but essentially competing ideas that have existed in
a state of tension for some 500 years. These ideas are:

• mare liberum, the concept that the seas cannot be made sovereign and
hence are free for all to use; and

• mare clausum, the idea that the seas can be made sovereign to the limits of
effective state control.
The delicate balance was achieved not through bloodshed, but rather through
an unprecedented degree of international consultation in the closing decades of
the 20th century to reconcile the vital interests of the great maritime powers
with the interests of coastal states. That balance was precisely what the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) achieved, making this
landmark international treaty arguably the crowning legal achievement in
history.
Few states have benefitted as much from the Law of the Sea treaty as Canada.
It has endowed us with an immense ocean estate, one that extends beyond our
shores to encompass the riches of more than 3.5% of the planet’s entire surface.
This represents a priceless inheritance for generations to come, with inalienable
sovereign authority over nearly one-half of this massive oceanic reach, but as
well special duties of care and custody for the resources and ecosystems of the remainder. Anything that challenges or threatens to challenge the geopolitical balance embodied in UNCLOS therefore touches deeply on Canada’s national
interest.
Given the enormous stakes involved, however, it is by no means assured that
the unique and remarkable consensus of maritime interests that occurred in the
latter half of the 20th century will withstand the tremendous changes this century is likely to witness. Ocean politics will make for a global maritime commons of great strategic complexity and growing strategic competition.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific, where ocean politics
already occupy centre-stage. China—the region’s most rapidly growing maritime power—acknowledged a fundamental strategic reality when it recently
stated that its principal vulnerabilities and threats came from the sea. This is a
remarkable shift for a state which has focused for millennia on protecting its
frontiers from threats originating inland. But it’s a shift that was also inevitable
as China assumed a more prominent place in a global system that depends on
maritime commerce and the fundamental openness of the “great commons,” as
Alfred T. Mahan once described them. It’s the echo of a powerful geopolitical
idea, expressed in the following words written in the early 16th century and now

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/7

NWCR_Autumn2010-McFadden.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:25:00 PM

2

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

McFadden: The Canadian Navy and Canada’s National Interests in This Maritim

MCFADDEN

51

pertinent to all states, that “[w]hoever is Lord of Malacca has his hand on the
1
throat of Venice.”
What is very clear today is that the world’s oceans no longer serve to shield
Canada from far-distant events. Rather, they connect us through a vast and intricate web of relationships—political, economic, financial and social—that has
made us neighbours with all the world’s peoples. Our prosperity and security are
thoroughly enmeshed in a global system that transcends all boundaries. It is a
system that depends to varying degrees on regulated air, space and cyber commons for its functioning, but it would not function at all without a regulated
ocean commons. Defending that system is not a matter of choice for Canada: it is
essential to our way of life.
In fact, I would maintain that the most essential public good of this globalized era is a regulated ocean commons. By this I mean a world in which the seas
are open for all to use freely and lawfully, regulated against the increasingly troubling range of illegal and criminal activities that are occurring on them, and defended against those who would threaten the pillars upon which the current
global system is built.
Thus, the organizing principle for the application of Canadian seapower in
this maritime century is to defend the global system both at sea and from the sea.
The strategic requirement this calls for is a globally deployable sea control navy,
with an operating concept of a maritime force not only held at readiness, but
also forward deployed.
The responsibility to regulate the ocean commons in our own home waters
must be taken by Canada alone, even if we were to develop closer arrangements
with our American neighbours to defend the three ocean approaches to North
America. But this task is not exclusively the preserve of the navy. It requires a
comprehensive, whole of government approach in which Canada is considered a
world leader.
Defending the global system may begin at home but it must also be defended
abroad, and this clearly is the work of navies. Only navies can ensure the safety of
waters that are likely to become increasingly contested by a range of actors.
These actors may be purely criminal and opportunistic, as we’re seeing today off
Somalia or the Gulf of Guinea, or they may be armed maritime groups whose
political purpose and access to increasingly sophisticated weapons can be used
to hold even an advanced navy at risk.
But even the largest of navies can’t be everywhere. This is why the leaders of
many like-minded navies speak of the need for a maritime strategy that seeks to
enlist all coastal states and maritime powers to regulate the ocean commons cooperatively, to the extent permitted by their capacities. We need to build a
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FIGURE 1

The frigate HMCS Toronto (FFH 333) on sovereignty patrol in Frobisher Bay, off Baffin Island, 2009
Canadian Forces

meaningful capacity within the Canadian Forces, including the navy, to help
build the capacity of others.
Not only must we defend the global system at sea, we must also defend the
conditions that permit the global system to flourish, by being able to operate as
part of a joint force “from the sea.” There’s a reason we’re seeing defence diplomacy becoming more focused on populations through the elevation of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to core military missions. It’s not just the
right thing to do, it’s in Canada’s national interest because of the crucial roles
these populations play in our collective future.
This is not to say that traditional maritime diplomacy will no longer be important. In fact, it is probably more important now in this globalized era than
“gunboat diplomacy” ever was. At the strategic level, forward-deployed maritime forces help to prevent and contain conflict, while also creating the conditions that can shape the success of joint forces should they ever be needed. They
provide Canada with insight and influence, promote trust and confidence
among our friends and give pause to our potential adversaries.
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At the operational level, forward-deployed maritime forces provide options
to government. They provide the capacity to respond quickly to unfolding
events and a range of choices that can be carefully calibrated to the situation, including creating the time for diplomacy to work, and declaring intent without
irreversible entanglement. Nothing says commitment like “boots on the
ground,” whether sailors, aviators or soldiers. However, when the decision is
taken to act, maritime forces provide governments the priceless advantage of
choosing when and where to commit a force. The use of the sea for operational
manoeuvre, as this advantage is called, can greatly amplify the employment of
even a relatively small ground force, as was the case in East Timor.
Defending the global system “from the sea” doesn’t require the kind of
high-end capabilities that are associated with modern amphibious warfare,
which tend in the public imagination to evoke images of Normandy, Iwo Jima or
Inchon. These kinds of capabilities are beyond Canada’s aspirations. What is
within our national ambitions, as declared by the current government, is the capacity, in relatively permissive environments, to deliver a force ashore and to
sustain it there indefinitely without reliance on shore-based infrastructure. As
Haiti so recently demonstrated, there is a whole range of operations where such
a capacity would permit Canada to project its power and influence to defend the
global system from the sea.
The world’s littoral regions—that strip of the planet where land meets sea, extending landward or seaward as far as force and influence can be projected from
either environment—will not always be as permissive as we saw in Haiti. Nonetheless, we will be drawn to these regions by our vital national interests. Over
three-quarters of the world’s population lives within 200 nautical miles of a
coast and over half of them within dense urban landscapes. Four out of five of
the world’s capital cities are to be found in the littoral region, and virtually all of
the world’s productive capacity. Moreover, these regions are where the effects of
massive change along every human axis—social, demographic, cultural, technological and climatological—are increasingly being concentrated. Accordingly,
there is little doubt that this is where Canada’s future joint force will operate, almost invariably as part of a large multinational operation led by our closest
allies.
As a battle space, the world’s littoral regions are becoming cluttered and congested, requiring the precise delivery of a whole range of effects, from the need
to win the “battle of competing narratives” at one end of a spectrum to the need
to take and hold ground at the other. As we’re seeing in Afghanistan, we will usually be more constrained by international law and the values of Canadian society
than the potential adversaries that Canada and its allies are likely to face. These
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FIGURE 2

HMCS Windsor (SS 877), a Victoria-class submarine, with the frigate HMCS Montréal (FFH 336) along the Atlantic seaboard in November 2005
Canadian Forces

are adversaries who have learned to integrate the warfare traditions of
Clausewitz and Mao Zedong and to organize all means of violence—criminal,
irregular and conventional—to achieve their political ends. This will make for
future joint operations of great ambiguity and complexity.
There are important implications in this for Canada’s maritime forces, including the fundamental capacity to fight and prevail in combat at sea against a
potentially far broader and more comprehensive range of threats than ever before. Our maritime forces must continue to be organized, trained and equipped
to control events in contested waters. The price of admission to these high-end
capabilities, including the capacity to lead multinational maritime operations, is
unlikely to go down.
It is far from certain that the West will continue to enjoy its current technological and materiel advantages, and Canada is unlikely ever to enjoy the advantage of numbers. This means that we must become far more agile and adaptable
as an integrated fighting force. Haiti demonstrated what we could achieve as an
integrated joint team in the face of great tragedy, and this operation achieved
more than a dozen exercises and months of doctrinal discussions could have
achieved. But much more remains to be done.
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The operation in Haiti illustrated one of our clear strengths—our people.
They are the key to our future success, and so they must remain a key area of investment. This is not merely a matter of bringing the number of sailors up to the
navy’s authorized strength, or of ensuring that the Canadian Forces adopt policies that make sense for a Canadian population that is evolving dramatically.
This is about making sure that our people have the skills and competencies that
hybrid warfare will demand, and deny to potential adversaries the advantages we
now concede them in terms of their superior knowledge of local terrain—physical, social and cultural.
The government gives the Canadian Forces responsibility for defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security. The navy has vital roles to play in all of these enduring pillars of defence
policy. Defending the global system is fundamental to all three, as is the capacity
to defend from the sea the conditions that permit the global system to prosper.
This is our unique contribution towards Canada’s prosperity, security and national interests, and has been since the navy’s creation in 1910. This is what
makes Canada’s globally deployable, sea control navy of enduring relevance in
this maritime century.

NOTES

This article originally appeared, under the title “The Navy and Canada’s National Interests in this Maritime Century,” in Canadian
Naval Review 6, no. 1 (Spring 2010). It is reprinted with permission. That article was
based on opening remarks made by Vice Admiral McFadden during a panel discussion to
examine “National Interests and Power

Projection: Required Capabilities,” at the
73rd Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, held in Ottawa,
3 March 2010.
1. Tomé Pires, Suma Oriental of Tome Pires: An
Account of the East, from the Red Sea to China,
Written in Malacca and India, 1512–1515.
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